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 This study advances the research on the U.S. corporate debt market by investigating a large 
sample of firms for the period from 2003 to 2018. I show that a substantial part of U.S. firms' 
debt is financed by outstanding bonds. Further, with regression analysis, I prove that firms 
which are less profitable, which have lower growth opportunities, lower leverage, and more 
cash reserves show a higher bond ratio. Also, a non-linear relationship for the size of a firm 
with the proportion of bond financing is revealed which implies that very small and very large 
firms have lower bond ratios. As one of few studies, I also show that firms utilize additional 
capital raised from bonds to invest in growth opportunities rather than keeping this capital as 
cash reserves on the balance sheet. Throughout the analysis, this study places special 
importance on the difference between the time before and after the Great Financial Crisis of 
2008.  With my results, I provide important implications for policymakers to define the future 
of the bond market and to answer the question on which firms should have access to it. 
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1 Introduction
The post-crisis period has experienced a considerable shift towards the bond market which is es-
pecially observable for non-financial companies (Sakoui and Bullock 2009; Avdjiev et. al 2017;
Çelik et. al 2019). This shift has been favored by cut-backs in credit supply from banks and low
interest rates. In specific, the international credit market experienced a shift from bank loans to
debt securities, where the latter share rose substantially from 48% in 2008 to 57% in 2018 (Alda-
soro and Ehlers 2018). The increased use of corporate bonds has as well been, in many economies,
supported by regulatory initiatives (Çelik et. al 2019). Regarding the just mentioned trends, it is
important to understand which firms finance themselves largely from the bond market and what
the additional funding is utilized for.
With time-series plots and fixed-effects regression analysis, I answer the research questions
on how U.S. firms finance themselves, i.e. what the proportion of bonds in their capital structure
is, which firms finance themselves largely from the bond market and which determinants explain
the choice of debt structure for firms in the U.S. Lastly and importantly, with dynamic regression
analysis on the change of the bond ratio, I am seeking to understand how companies are employing
the proceedings from corporate debt issuance.
The results indicate that a substantial part of U.S. firms’ debt is financed with outstanding
bonds. Regression analysis reveal that firms which are less profitable, which have lower growth
opportunities, lower leverage, and higher cash reserves show a higher bond ratio. The relationship
with size and bond ratio is found to be non-linear, bell-shaped. This implies that very small and
very large firms have lower bond ratios whereas companies which size lies in between have higher
bond ratios. Interestingly, the relationships between the dependent variable and the classification
of whether a firm is investment-grade or not and the distinction between the period before and after
the financial crisis are positive and firm-specific. Overall, the results are in line with the pecking
order theory of capital structure which states that a firm’s capital structure decisions are driven by
the degree of information asymmetry implying that firms with less internal funds make more use
of bond financing as their other financing options are used up earlier. A very important finding
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of this study is that additional capital raised from bonds harms profitability in the short-term and
that it has a positive effect on investments on a longer time frame. This implies that firms invest
funds raised from bonds in growth opportunities rather than keeping them as cash reserves on the
balance sheet. Yet, it also reveals that bond financing does not improve a firm’s profitability in the
long-run. Overall, this positive effect that the change in bond ratio has on investment is driven by
the period before the Great Financial Crisis and not observable afterwards.
My work adds value to the current body of research by assessing the debt structure with the
measure bond ratio and placing a special attention on the time before and after the financial crisis,
motivated by it representing a trigger point for the corporate financing with bonds. To the best
of my knowledge, this study is one of few researches that investigates how additional funding of
bonds impacts investment behaviour, cash, and profitability by assessing dynamic regressions.
In the literature, there exist many studies that investigate the determinants of capital structure
and there is also a large body of literature on the choice of private and public debt, hence on the
debt structure. Faulkender an Petersen (2006) document that, after controlling for a large set of
relevant firm characteristics, differentiation across types of debt seems to substantially affect a
firm’s capital structure. They find that firms which have access to public markets enjoy higher debt
capacities than firms that can only access the private debt markets, and hence are less likely to
underleverage.
In a more recent study, Kale and Meneghetti (2011) provide a synthesis of results for this area
of research and conclude that the choice between public and private debt is governed by four basic
factors. Firstly, the degree of certification a company needs, secondly, the potential leakage of
valuable proprietary information, thirdly, the preference for private bank debt when monitoring of
managerial actions generates value, and lastly, the flexibility in bank debt to renegotiate the contract
terms in times of distress. Based on a large sample of U.S. firms from 2002 to 2009, Colla et. al
(2013) highlight the dominant role of bond capital in a firm’s debt structure. Their central finding
is that most firms, around 85% of their sample, borrow mainly with one type of debt indicating a
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tendency toward specialization in debt. Morellec et. al (2015) study the choice between bonds and
bank loans in the light of a firm’s financing decisions. They find that companies with higher growth
potential, with a more favourable negotiation position, which are subject to lower credit supply, or
which operate in more competitive environments, are more probable to raise money from bonds.
Further, for example, Bharath et al. (2009) prove that asymmetric information drives capital
structure for U.S. firms between 1973 and 2002. Likewise, Gomes and Phillips (2012) show that
asymmetric information plays an important role in why public firms issue private or public securi-
ties. In specific, they reveal that a company’s probability to issue debt increases with asymmetric
information while it decreases for the issuance of equity.
The broad topic of capital structure and debt structure is also discussed by Rauh and Sufi
(2010) who stress the importance of debt heterogeneity and focus on the credit quality of firms.
The authors find that low-credit-quality firms are more likely to spread the priority of their capital
structure than high-credit quality firms. Several years earlier, Bolton and Freixas (2000) show in
their research paper about equity, bonds, and bank debt that in an equilibrium state riskier firms
prefer bank loans while the safer ones prefer the financing with bonds. Firms which lie in the
middle choose to issue both equity and bonds. A very recent study by Albrizio et. al (2019)
examines market responses to monetary policy announcements taking into account U.S. corporate
bond data between 2003 and 2016 and the role and trend of high-yield bonds. They find that
unconventional monetary policy has increased investors’ appetite for high-yield U.S. corporate
bonds, consequently altering the access for high-yield firms to the market.
As reviewed, many studies explore the choice between public and private debt often by ap-
plying logit regressions models, hence focusing on the probability of the choice. This study, in
contrast, assesses the debt structure with the level of bond ratio and places special focus on the
time before and after the financial crisis. It further analyses the impact of the change of bond ra-
tio on investment, cash-holdings, and profitability with the goal to understand how companies are
employing the proceedings from corporate debt issuance.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data sample
and variables. In Section 3, the empirical results are discussed and for the regression analysis sub-
divided into main results and further analysis with focus on the time before and after the financial




I study firm financials and bond-issuances of U.S. public firms for the time period January 2003 to
December 2018 on a quarterly basis. Firm accounting data is retrieved from the CRSP/Compustat
Merged (CCM) database whereas for the bond issuances Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD) is accessed. Both databases are provided by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS),
an online academic resource for bulk access to stock market, company financial, and economic
data. When matching CCM with Mergent’s FISD data, the selection of bonds included in the final
data sample follows the linking logic provided by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
This procedure ensures the correct matching of firm-characteristics and bonds by imposing a con-
servative date range for Compustat financials to which a specific bond-issue can be linked (WRDS
2017). As the reporting of bond-issuances for the year 2019 was incomplete for the point in time
this study was conducted, the data sample limits itself to the end of the year 2018 (Appendix Table
5). Following the standard practice in literature, I exclude financial firms (Standard Classification
(SIC) codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). I also remove firm-quarters with
missing or zero values for total assets, firm-quarters with missing or zero values for total debt, and
missing values for the control variables of interest. The final data sample consists of 51,261 firm-
quarter observations. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix in Table 6 and all ratios
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to minimize the impact of data errors and outliers.
Appendix Table 7 shows that, on average, U.S. firms between 2003 and 2018 have 69.2% of
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their debt financed by outstanding bonds, with a minimum value of 28.4% and a maximum value
of 100%. Regarding the balance sheet size of the firms present in my sample, the average amount
of assets for the firms amounts to roughly USD 14,886 million, with a broad range of a minimum
total assets of USD 2,0 million to USD 534,870 million. Further, on average, firms in my sample
have a market leverage of 22.9% and a market-to-book value of 1.345, indicating that the firms are
overvalued, hence that they show growth opportunities.
In order to provide a better understanding on which bonds are included in the final dataset
after applying the WRDS linking logic, Appendix Table 8 summarizes the bond-issues included
in the sample, showing the number of issues and the aggregated offering amount of those bond
issuances per year. After matching Mergent’s FISD bond-issuances to Compustat financials, there
is no considerable difference or trend noticeable between the different years regarding the number
of issuances and the sum of offering amounts. This is due to the linking logic which drops out is-
suances that cannot be accurately matched. However, when considering the entire Mergent’s FISD
dataset before matching it to the Compustat financials (Appendix Table 5), there is a clear trend
noticeable that the number of issuances and likewise the aggregated amount of offering amounts
increased substantially by 2018. In specific, the number of issuances increased by roughly 3.4
times from 4,973 to 16,713, whereas the aggregated offering amount increased by roughly 1.4
times from USD 717.36 billion to USD 1025,17 billion from 2003 to 2018. This demonstrates a
considerable increase of bond activity and that, on average, smaller but more bonds are issued over
time.
2.2 Calculation of the variable of interest bond ratio






The outstanding amount of bonds is chosen, in contrast to the offering amount, as it gives the
correct amount of outstanding bonds for each quarter. This ensures a more accurate representation
of the debt structure for a firm at each point in time. When applying the calculation, several
observations return a bond ratio which is greater than one hundred percent, possibly caused by
delays in reporting the issued bonds in the total debt. Those observations, which show bond ratios
greater than one hundred percent, are set to one hundred percent with the justification that those
firms finance a very large part of their debt by bonds. Further, when testing another approach
on the assessment of the independent variable, both methods yielded the same results in the later
following regression analysis. This stated approach would have been to assign the bond ratio into
quintiles, with the goal to define companies that have very low, low, medium, high, or very high
bond ratios into clusters.
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3 Empirical Evidence and Discussion
3.1 Development of the bond ratio
In order to analyze how U.S. firms finance themselves, that means what their proportion of public
debt in their capital structure is and how that debt structure evolved over time, I plot several time-
series graphs for my period of interest from 2003 to 2018.
The time-series graph in Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the development of the average bond
ratio for U.S. firms over the sample period. Overall, the level of bond ratio is fairly stable and fell
slightly from 67.4% in the first quarter of 2003 to 64.6% in the fourth quarter of 2018. The bond
ratio was highest before and after the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 with a maximum of 73.0%
in the third quarter of 2005 and 72.7% in the first quarter of 2010. The steep increase in the level
of bond ratio in the first quarter of 2010 is most likely due to the substitution for bank loans as
a consequence of the financial crisis when credit supply was tight. A similar development was
found by De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) for the euro area. They found a counteracting development
for bank loans and debt securities throughout and after the financial crisis of 2008 (De Fiore and
Uhlig 2015). The slight drop of the bond ratio close to 2009 might be explained by the firms’
preference for bank debt when the flexibility to renegotiate debt contracts is valuable, which is the
case during financial distress and in times of crisis (Kale and Meneghetti 2011).
Considering the weighted average for the bond ratio by size, in Appendix Figure 3, the develop-
ment is slightly different and indicates a clear increase in the bond ratio from 2003 to 2018, where
the bond ratio lies between 51.9% and 66.1%. This weighted development is also very well illus-
trated in Appendix Figure 4 which shows the proportion of total debt taken by outstanding bonds in
USD billion in a stacked line graph. An explanation for the recent and future trend of rising bonds
in the financing structure is that companies choose bonds for cheap funds due to the currently low-
interest rates and increasing inflows into fixed-income funds. While the cost of capital for banks
is increasing, the cost of bond market funding is at an all-time low for some companies (Sakoui
and Bullock 2009). To sum it up, the graphs provide evidence that a substantial part of U.S. firms’
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debt is financed by outstanding bonds for the entire sample period. In particular, between 50%
and 66% of the debt is financed by outstanding bonds in absolute terms, whereas disregarding the
size of a firm, the average bond ratio ranges between 65% and 73% on an aggregated yearly basis.
The lower percentage of bond financing for the weighted approach is explained by the fact that the
very large firms in the sample have a comparably low bond ratio. This pattern is further proved
and analyzed in a cluster analysis in the next paragraph which is conducted to better understand
the structure and characteristics of the analyzed data set.
Cluster analysis is a technique commonly used to discover unknown structures and patterns
in data sets. The k-means clustering approach aims to minimize within-cluster variances, which
means the squared Euclidean distances of a firm-year observation from the center of its own cluster.
It further maximizes the variances between those clusters. Applying the elbow method to deter-
mine the optimal number of clusters yields four final clusters for the data set (Appendix Figure 10).
Implementing this approach, the within-cluster sum of squares ist plotted for different values of
clusters. The location of a bend, or knee, in the plot, is a good indicator of the appropriate number
of clusters (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990; Everitt and Hothorn 2005).
Cluster 1 with 43,534 observations is the largest, representing 85% of the data sample and has
an average bond ratio of 74.8%. All the other clusters represent a smaller subset of the data sample
and distinguish themselves mainly by being firms with larger size. The second biggest cluster,
Cluster 2, with 6,026 observations, has an average bond ratio of 71.5% and represents 12% of
the dataset. Cluster 3 has 1,345 observations, corresponding to 3% of the dataset, and shows an
average bond ratio of 48,5% whereas the very smallest cluster, Cluster 4, with 356 observations
shows an average bond ratio level of 46.4%. It is noteworthy that firms in the smallest cluster
are mainly firm-observations from very large corporations such as Apple Inc., Toyota, Microsoft,
Verizon, British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon Mobile, Ford, ATT, Vodafone, Total S.A., Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A., and General Motors.
To summarize, the cluster analysis gives a first indication that very large firms have a lower
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bond ratio while 85% of the firms in the sample are fairly similar. Further, it is interesting to note
that the smaller clusters, hence the larger firms, are those which are more likely to pay dividends,
to have an investment-grade rating, and to have higher cash-flows.
With my second research question, I want to understand whether certain industries rely more
on the public debt market. Further, I analyze whether and which differences there are for higher
or lower-rated companies to access the financing with bonds. For the latter split, the expectation
is that higher-rated firms have easier access to the market. Hence, those firms should also finance
themselves more with corporate bonds.
Appendix Figure 6 provides time-series evidence for the industry split. All industries’ develop-
ment of the bond ratio lies fairly close together. On average, the Construction and Mining industry
has the highest bond ratio development and Transportation & Communication shows the low-
est bond ratio. The other industries which are Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Manufacturing,
Services, Retail Trade and Wholesale Trade lie in between in the stated order. The Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing industry is excluded from the graph due to irregular reporting of their fi-
nancials or bond issuances. It is noticeable that it is the capital-intensive industries Construction,
Mining and Manufacturing that show the highest proportion of bond financing.
In Appendix Figure 7, I plot the average bond ratio split by whether a firm is considered
investment-grade or not and an interesting trend is observable. Whereas before the Great Financial
Crisis high-yield firms financed themselves with a slightly larger proportion of bonds, after 2009
this trend switched and the bond ratio of investment-grade firms increased. This can be explained
with the fact that investment-grade firms increased their issuance of bonds post-crisis in order to
substitute the shortage of bank loans.
Appendix Fgure 8, which measures the weighted bond ratio by the size of a firm, shows that
investment-grade firms have a consistently higher bond ratio which increases over time whereas
the percentage of bonds in debt remains stable and around 50% for high-yield firms. This devel-
opment is in line with the expectation that investment-grade firms have easier access to the market
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and hence hold a higher proportion of bonds in their debt structure. The difference in Figure 7
and Figure 8 in the Appendix can be explained by the findings of the previously conducted cluster
analysis that larger firms show a higher likelihood for investment-grade rating which in conse-
quence shifts the line for investment-grade firms upwards for the weighted approach. As probably
more firms were rated investment-grade before the crisis and were down-graded afterwards, this
shift for the weighted-approach occurred more strongly for the period before 2008. Further, an
explanation for the increasing trend of bond ratio for investment-grade firms while the high-yield
line remains fairly constant is the following. Those firms that have easier access to the market,
namely higher-rated firms, can more easily increase their percentage of bonds in the debt structure.
In other words, investment-grade firms can take advantage of the benefits of bond funding while
in comparison high-yield-firms prefer private debt, probably also due to an information advantage
and a better renegotiation position regarding debt contracts (Kale and Meneghetti 2011).
Overall, Construction, Mining and Manufacturing show on average the highest bond ratio over
the sample period. Further, firms that are considered investment-grade show higher financing with
bonds, especially with a shift after the financial crisis of 2008.
3.2 Regression analysis on the level of bond ratio
The time-series graphs give a first idea of how the funding with bonds developed over time and
what role the industry and the rating of a firm play. However, these findings are not enough to
draw statistically valid conclusions. With the third research question, I want to focus on which
determinants explain the choice of debt structure for firms in the United States. For that, I run
panel regressions on my data set accounting for different linear grouped fixed-effects by firm,
industry, and quarter represented by different columns in the regression tables. I further implement
robust and multi-way clustered standard errors for every level. The regression equation of interest
is as follows where the indexes ’i’ and ’t’ indicate the firms and the year-quarters respectively:
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Bond ratioit = Pro f itabilityit +Sizeit +Size
2
it +Market   to book valueit
+Market leverageit +Dividendsit +Tangibilityit +Cash  f lowit
+Cash holdingsit + IGit +GFCit
(2)
The regression results for my main regression are reported in Table 1. For all specifications in
Table 1, the bond ratio of a firm is negatively related to the size, the market-to-book value and the
market leverage of a firm. The negative relationship with profitability is also significant but at the
lower 10% significance level. These results show a strong statistical significance. For the variable
size, additionally, a significant non-linear relationship is proved by regressing the squared value
of size. Likewise, the cash-holdings of a firm are positively related to the bond ratio across all
specifications with high statistical significance. For the dummy variable whether an observation
occurred before the Great Financial Crisis or after (GFC), all specifications except the last one
in column (6) with firm-quarter fixed-effects show a significant positive relation. The remaining
control variables, dividends and cash-flow show inconsistent results in terms of relationship and
significance. The dummy variable IG is not significant for specifications with firm fixed-effects,
yet shows a consistently positive relation with the level of bond ratio for all other models.
It is interesting to note that for the significant coefficients, the results of the dependent variable
bond ratio are very similar to the regressions with the capital structure ratio market leverage as a
dependent variable (Appendix Table 9). This confirms the nature of the bond ratio, which is like-
wise considered a capital structure ratio, on the debt-level. Further, this point is supported by the
fact that the variable market leverage has the highest impact on the dependent variable which can
be retrieved from the level of the coefficient. The two variables showing the highest magnitude are
size and cash-holdings. For the market leverage for example, if the ratio increases by one hundred
percent, the bond ratio decreases by roughly 0.7 decimal points, or 70%. Likewise, if size increases
by one hundred percent, the bond ratio decreases by roughly 19%. For cash-holdings, a coefficient
around 0.18 decimal points implies that if the cash-holdings ratio increases by one hundred per-
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cent, the proportion of outstanding bonds in total debt increases by 18%. Market-to-book value has
a comparably lower impact with a coefficient around minus 0.05 decimal points. This magnitude
implies that if the market-to-book value increases by one hundred percent, the level of bond ratio
decreases by approximately 5%. The relationship of the profitability of a firm with its bond ratio
is only significant at the 10% level, yet shows a relatively large coefficient. This implies that if
the profitability ratio increases by one hundred percent, the bond ratio decreases by approximately
26%. For the squared variable of size, indicating a non-linear relationship, the interpretation of the
coefficient is more difficult. Unlike a linear relationship, the effect on the bond ratio changes based
on the specific value of squared size. If the value for squared size is located before the peak of the
bell-shape, an additional unit increases the bond ratio. In contrast, if the value is located after the
peak, an additional unit of squared size decreases the bond ratio.
The results imply that larger firms have a lower bond ratio. At first glance, this relationship
seems counterintuitive as larger firms should benefit from a better access to the bond market,
economies of scale in issuing bonds, and a lower need for tailor-made financing (ICMA 2013;
McKinsey Global Institute 2018). Historically, bond markets were limited to large corporations
only due to a very high cost of issuance, however the range of issuers who have access to the
market has broadened (ICMA 2013). A possible explanation for the inverse relationship of the
bond ratio and the size of a firm is provided by Colla et. al (2013) which state that “large, mature,
profitable firms with more tangible assets, high leverage, and credit rating use multiple [debt]
sources” (Colla et. al 2013). For my analysis, this implies that larger firms have multiple types
of debt for financing and hence each debt source comprises a lower proportion of the total debt,
driving down the bond ratio.
Studying and proving the non-linear relationship of the size of a firm with the level of bond
ratio sheds new light on the relationship. The positive non-linear relationship of the two variables
indicates a bell-shaped behavior implying that the bond ratio is low for very small and very large
firms whereas it is high for firms with sizes that lie in the middle. Hence indeed, matching ex-
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pectations, the bond ratio tends to be low for small firms as well which can probably be traced
back to difficulties in accessing the corporate debt market due to missing requirements such as the
existence of a debt rating, the fulfillment of a minimum issuance volume and the meeting of strict
standards regarding the investment prospectus (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; Feihle and Lawrenz
2017). Yet, it is also lower for very big firms and conglomerates like General Electrics and Co.
as they usually diversify their debt more, hence each debt type takes up a lower percentage of the
debt structure (Appendix Table 10).
The negative relationship of the bond ratio with the profitability of a firm implies that more
profitable firms have a lower proportion of their debt financed by outstanding bonds. This can
again be explained by the previously mentioned findings of Colla et. al (2013) which state that
more profitable firms use multiple debt sources (Colla et. al 2013), and hence the percentage
of each debt type is lower. When reviewing the regression results, I found that the results are
very consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure. Especially for the regression
where the dependent variable is market leverage (Appendix Table 9), the commonly applied capital
structure measure, the determinants behave according to the theoretical impacts of the corporate
capital structure pecking order theory (Hang et. al 2018).
According to the pecking order theory, the cost of financing increases with asymmetric infor-
mation. Companies first prefer internal financing and then debt, lastly equity. The more earnings
a company has, the more profitable it is and the less it has to rely on external funding like private
and public debt (Myers and Majluf 1984). When a company faces the choice between private or
public debt, there is less information asymmetry in private lending compared to the corporate debt
market. Due to their closer relationship with the firms, banks and other private lenders are more
effective at monitoring borrowers, and consequently have an informational advantage over lenders
in the public debt market (Leland and Pyle 1977; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Abad et. al 2017).
Hence, according to the pecking order theory which aims to reduce asymmetric information, pri-
vate lending is preferred over public lending which explains the lower bond ratio for profitable
firms (see Figure 1). Those profitable firms would first try to meet their financial needs with re-
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tained earnings, from which they have more available than less profitable companies, or bank debt.
For less profitable firms, the financial lending in the corporate debt market is higher because their
capacity of internal funds is used up earlier and they also get granted fewer private debt as they
provide less security and higher that of default to banks. Of course, this explanation is only valid
to a certain degree of lower profits, not implying firms which are close to default. Further, this only

















igher cost of financing and higher risk
Figure 1: Pecking order theory
The market-to-book value is negatively related to the proportion of outstanding bonds in the
debt structure which implies that firms with more growth opportunities finance themselves with
fewer bonds. This pattern can be explained by the findings of Hadlock and James (2002) who ask
why some firms borrow from public sources while others borrow from banks. They find that under-
valued firms tend to borrow from banks because banks have the ability to accurately price financial
claims and thus alleviate any information asymmetry problem. In short, the information benefit
of bank debt finance pushes undervalued firms towards financing with private debt which is an-
other link to the idea of the pecking order theory discussed above (Hadlock and James 2002). The
authors also establish this link to the pecking order theory and refer to the prior work of MacKie-
Mason (1989) who proposes a modified approach to theory in which firms prefer retained earnings
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over new share issues and private debt over public debt when information problems are severe
(Hadlock and James 2002). Gomes and Phillips (2012) also refer to Myers and Majluf’s (1984)
pecking order theory to explain why undervalued firms may refrain from raising finance. They
argue that this occurs due to the dilution cost of selling underpriced securities. Other researches,
Morellec et. al (2015), examine the choice between bonds and bank loans and their relation to
corporate investment. They find that firms with more growth options, equaling a higher-market-to-
book value, are more likely to issue bonds. Further, the authors state that those are the firms which
accelerate investment (Morellec et. al 2015).
The negative relationship for the bond ratio with market leverage can be placed in line with the
previous explanations. The more leverage a firm has in its capital structure, the lower is the bond
ratio as the debt structure is more diversified (Colla et. al 2013).
The effect that higher cash-holdings on the balance sheet are associated with a higher bond
ratio can be explained by the fact that cash-holdings provide safety to potential investors. Those
firms who provide more safety to their investors also attract more investors and hence can issue
more bonds. The idea behind is that investors also consider the possibility that a company may
default on its debt and hence consider higher cash-holdings a security for less credit or default risk.
Colla et. al (2013) likewise found a positive relationship between the degree of debt specialization
and cash-holdings which would mean a higher bond ratio for more cash-holdings following my
earlier argumentation of debt diversification.
The dummy variable IG is significant and positive for specifications (1)(2)(4)(5), however not
significant for columns where I account for firm fixed-effects. Hence, the reason why firms change
their issue behaviour when they are rated investment-grade is firm-specific. That implies that some
firms change their issuance behaviour if they are rated investment-grade and some do not. A further
explanation for the positive relation of rating and bond ratio, which was already indicated in the
time-series graphs in Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the Appendix, is that the main difference between
bonds and bank debt is the monitoring function of banks (Rauh and Sufi 2010). According to Rauh
and Sufi (2010), banks can investigate the borrower’s future profitability, whereas bondholders
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always liquidate the borrower. In their model, high-quality firms do not value the ability of banks
to investigate and therefore rely primarily on arms-length type of debt to avoid additional cost of
bank debt associated with monitoring.
The control variable GFC shows a similar pattern to the variable IG. The positive relationship
with the dummy variable GFC indicates that the bond ratio of firms after the Great Financial Cri-
sis tends to be higher. This is in line with the motivation of this study, namely the push towards
the bond market after the Great Financial Crisis when bank credit was restricted. A further ex-
planation for the very recent and future trend of rising bond financing comes from the previously
mentioned Financial Times Article of 2009. Companies choose bonds for cheap funds favoured
by the currently low-interest rates and increasing inflows into fixed-income funds. While the cost
of capital for banks is increasing, the cost of bond market funding is at an all-time low for some
companies (Sakoui and Bullock 2009). However, the relationship is not true for specification in
column (6) where I account for firm-quarter fixed-effects, hence the reason why firms change their
issue activity post-crisis is firm-specific, which means some firms change their issuance behaviour
post-crisis and some do not.
The latter finding of firm-specific effects was motivation to undertake further analysis and
to investigate the post-crisis issuances and the investment-grade firms subsample more closely.
Specifically, I sorted all firm-quarter observations with investment-grade rating by highest bond
ratio and then defined the data set into quintiles. The goal is to get a first understanding of why
and which firms with investment-grade rating issue more bonds in order to reveal firm-specific
patterns. The pattern in Appendix Table 11 provides an indication that for those quintiles with a
higher bond ratio, firms have a higher market-to-book value, a lower market leverage and a higher
cash-holding. It is important to note that the relationships for market leverage and cash-holdings
are in line with the previously discussed regressions results which is not the case for the market-
to-book value. In search for a better understanding of the firm-specific pattern, I had a closer look
at the sub-sample for investment-grade firms and found that there exists a lot of homogeneity for
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firms that show a high bond ratio. Namely, many firms with very high bond ratios show the same
debt structure, for example a bond ratio equal to one hundred percent, for almost the entire sample
period. For lower bond ratios, in contrast, there exists more heterogeneity of the bond ratio in
firms. This provides an explanation of the firm-specific effect in the control variable IG, observed
by the insignificant effect for the specifications (3) and (6) in the main regression in Table 1.
For the subsample including only post-crisis observations, I follow the same approach and define
the sorted bond ratios into quintiles. A similar pattern regarding the relationships of the control
variables is observable, however, no specific structure in the subsample was detected to explain the
firm-specific effects.
As no satisfying explanation for the firm-specific effects for the dummy variable GFC was
found, the next subsection will conduct analysis with placing special focus on the period before
and after the financial crisis.
3.2.1 Further analysis with a focus on the time period before and after the financial crisis
In this section, I study the control variables which explain the level of bond ratio by taking into
account the interaction of the dummy variable GFC. The intention behind this analysis is to study
whether the relationship of my dependent variable of interest bond ratio and the control variables
is influenced by a third variable, in this case whether we look at the time period before or after the
financial crisis.
Table 2 shows that with the interaction of the dummy variable GFC, only the control variable
tangibility of a firm is consistently and highly significant with a positive relation. This implies that
the positive relationship of the bond ratio and the tangibility of a firm is influenced by whether the
observation occurs before the financial crisis or after.
For a more thorough analysis, I run separate regressions for the subsample with observations
before the financial crisis and another regression for the time period after (Table 3 and Table 4).
For the time before the financial crisis, the tangibility of a firm is negatively related and significanft
for specifications (1)(2)(4)(5) with no fixed-effects, quarter fixed-effects or industry fixed-effects
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Table 1
Bond ratio and firm characteristics
This table represents the main regression outputs namely the regressions of firm-characteristics on the level
of bond ratio (dependent variable) of that firm. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter level.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
BOND RATIO
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability  0.332⇤  0.360⇤  0.194⇤  0.232⇤  0.276⇤  0.151⇤
(0.189) (0.198) (0.111) (0.180) (0.190) (0.096)
Size  0.148⇤⇤⇤  0.149⇤⇤⇤  0.271⇤⇤⇤  0.151⇤⇤⇤  0.151⇤⇤⇤  0.263⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.043)
Size2 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Market-to-book value  0.050⇤⇤⇤  0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.057⇤⇤⇤  0.052⇤⇤⇤  0.049⇤⇤⇤  0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Market leverage  0.797⇤⇤⇤  0.799⇤⇤⇤  0.558⇤⇤⇤  0.734⇤⇤⇤  0.735⇤⇤⇤  0.566⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.043) (0.043) (0.051)
Dividends 0.000 0.000  0.023⇤⇤ 0.001 0.001  0.026⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Tangibility 0.002 0.002 0.136⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤ 0.146⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.063) (0.032) (0.033) (0.062)
Cash-flow  0.025  0.022 0.092⇤⇤  0.001 0.011 0.072⇤
(0.076) (0.089) (0.046) (0.071) (0.084) (0.043)
Cash-holdings 0.169⇤⇤⇤ 0.165⇤⇤⇤ 0.187⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤ 0.186⇤⇤⇤ 0.173⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
IG 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 0.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028)
GFC 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤ 0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.005
(0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Firm FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES NO NO YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261
R2 0.188 0.189 0.666 0.203 0.204 0.669
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.188 0.652 0.203 0.203 0.655
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and positively related for specifications (3) and (6), accounting for firm fixed-effects. Hence, this
relationship again proves the firm-specific effect of the control variable GFC which is likewise
observed in the main regression without interaction (Table 1).
What conclusion can we draw from this analysis with interaction? Overall, on a broader scope
before the financial crisis, the higher tangibility of firms is associated with a lower bond ratio,
whereas on the firm-level, a higher tangibility results in a higher level of bond ratio. In many stud-
ies, tangibility is considered a measure for bankruptcy risk, for example in the paper of Colla et.
al (2013). The researchers found a consistent and negative relationship of asset tangibility, in line
with our non-firm level results in columns (1),(2),(4), and (5). They argue that firms with higher
bankruptcy risk, implying a lower tangibility, specialize in one type of debt to reduce negotiation
costs, which would mean a higher bond ratio for my analysis (Colla et. al 2013). For the positive
relationship with tangibility before the financial crisis on the more narrow firm-level, I provide
the following explanation. Considering individual firm choices, those firms with more tangibility,
equaling to lower bankruptcy risk, provide more security to investors, show lower credit risk and
hence can issue more bonds than less tangible companies as they attract more investors.
With the goal to find a change in patterns for the period before and after the Great Financial
Crisis apart from the previously analyzed variable Tangibility, I compare the respective regression
results focusing on the main differences in Table 3 and Table 4.
For both time periods, the negative relationship of the bond ratio with, size, market-to-book
value and market leverage and the positive relationship with cash holdings are the most decisive
factors. This confirms the robustness and the relevance of the control variables for my entire
research. Also, market leverage, cash-holdings and size show the highest impact in terms of coef-
ficients, likewise to the main regression in Table 1. It is important to stress out that the effect of
whether a firm is investment-grade or not (IG) became more decisive, that means gained in signifi-
cance, after the GFC, and still drops out for firm fixed-effects. This fosters the picture that whether
an investment-grade firm issues a higher bond ratio is firm-specific which was already prevalent in
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Table 2
Bond ratio and firm characteristics with GFC interaction
This table represents another main regression output, namely the regressions of firm-characteristics on the
level of bond ratio (dependent variable) of that firm with the interaction of the financial crisis dummy vari-
able (GFC). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
BOND RATIO
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability*GFC  0.389  0.379  0.248  0.157  0.155  0.147
(0.343) (0.356) (0.239) (0.320) (0.332) (0.226)
Size*GFC  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.010  0.010  0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
Size2 ⇤GFC 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market-to-book value*GFC 0.022 0.020 0.054⇤⇤⇤ 0.025⇤ 0.024⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Market leverage*GFC  0.061  0.057 0.102  0.084  0.082 0.086
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062)
Dividends*GFC 0.030⇤ 0.030⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.028 0.028 0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Tangibility*GFC 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.158⇤⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤ 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.135⇤⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Cash-flow*GFC 0.165 0.182 0.043 0.167 0.182 0.091
(0.122) (0.143) (0.095) (0.110) (0.130) (0.094)
Cash-holdings*GFC  0.056⇤  0.049  0.105⇤⇤⇤  0.069⇤⇤  0.064⇤⇤  0.092⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
IG*GFC 0.023 0.023  0.031⇤ 0.021 0.021  0.031⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Firm FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES NO NO YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261
R2 0.194 0.195 0.673 0.209 0.210 0.675
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.194 0.659 0.208 0.209 0.661
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the main regression (Table 1) where we had insignificant results for the specifications (3) and (6),
accounting for firm fixed-effects. This stronger positive relationship for investment-grade firms
after the financial crisis is conceptually in line with Appendix Figure 8 in which I plotted the de-
velopment of the bond ratio separately for investment-grade and high-yield firms weighted by size
and where the gap between the bond ratio of both groups became larger for the period after 2008.
Summed up, after the financial crisis, the rating of a firm was decisive on how high the level of
bond ratio of a firm was, and the level of bond ratio behaves firm-specific.
To conclude the further analysis on the level of bond ratio with the focus on the financial crisis,
it reveals a special role of the variable tangibility. The relationship of tangibility and bond ratio
becomes significantly positive with the interaction of the dummy variable GFC, implying that
the positive relationship of the bond ratio and the tangibility of a firm is influenced by whether
the observation occurs before the financial crisis or after. In the period before the financial crisis,
tangibility is further negatively related to broader fixed-effects whereas it is positively related to the
bond ratio on the more narrow firm-level. Further, the separate regressions for the period before
and after the financial crisis are robust to the regression on the overall sample, yet the variable
indicating investment-grade becomes more decisive after the financial crisis.
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Table 3
Bond ratio and firm characteristics before the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents regressions of firm-characteristics on the level of bond ratio (dependent variable) of that
firm for the period before the financial crisis (2003 to 2010). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter
level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
BOND RATIO
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability  0.189  0.226  0.021  0.176  0.221  0.063
(0.218) (0.226) (0.149) (0.216) (0.224) (0.123)
Size  0.126⇤⇤⇤  0.125⇤⇤⇤  0.188⇤⇤⇤  0.126⇤⇤⇤  0.125⇤⇤⇤  0.137⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.050) (0.024) (0.024) (0.050)
Size2 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.006 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Market-to-book value  0.060⇤⇤⇤  0.056⇤⇤⇤  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.063⇤⇤⇤  0.059⇤⇤⇤  0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Market leverage  0.777⇤⇤⇤  0.780⇤⇤⇤  0.748⇤⇤⇤  0.728⇤⇤⇤  0.731⇤⇤⇤  0.716⇤⇤⇤
(0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.059)
Dividends  0.013  0.013  0.017  0.013  0.014  0.021⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Tangibility  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.072⇤⇤ 0.152⇤  0.100⇤⇤⇤  0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.140⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.076) (0.034) (0.034) (0.074)
Cash-flow  0.103  0.113 0.074  0.079  0.082 0.045
(0.084) (0.090) (0.062) (0.082) (0.091) (0.042)
Cash-holdings 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.185⇤⇤⇤ 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.210⇤⇤⇤ 0.203⇤⇤⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021)
IG 0.029⇤ 0.028⇤ 0.034⇤⇤ 0.033⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.016) (0.000) (0.016) (0.016) (0.000)
Firm FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES NO NO YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 26,653 26,653 26,653 26,653 26,653 26,653
R2 0.223 0.225 0.741 0.228 0.231 0.747
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.224 0.725 0.228 0.229 0.731
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Table 4
Bond ratio and firm characteristics after the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents regressions of firm-characteristics on the level of bond ratio (dependent variable) of that
firm for the period after the financial crisis (2010 to 2018). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter
level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
BOND RATIO
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability  0.578⇤⇤  0.606⇤  0.282⇤  0.239⇤  0.284⇤  0.181⇤
(0.287) (0.301) (0.159) (0.256) (0.270) (0.132)
Size  0.133⇤⇤⇤  0.132⇤⇤⇤  0.338⇤⇤⇤  0.145⇤⇤⇤  0.144⇤⇤⇤  0.347⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.035) (0.069) (0.034) (0.034) (0.068)
Size2 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Market-to-book value  0.038⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤  0.083⇤⇤⇤  0.039⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤  0.114⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Market leverage  0.838⇤⇤⇤  0.837⇤⇤⇤  0.573⇤⇤⇤  0.782⇤⇤⇤  0.780⇤⇤⇤  0.660⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.055) (0.056) (0.066)
Dividends 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.018 0.018  0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Tangibility 0.086⇤⇤ 0.086⇤⇤ 0.196⇤⇤  0.047  0.047 0.194⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.036) (0.092) (0.043) (0.043) (0.090)
Cash-flow 0.061 0.069 0.145⇤ 0.085 0.100 0.166⇤⇤⇤
(0.107) (0.132) (0.075) (0.090) (0.112) (0.060)
Cash-holdings 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.106⇤⇤⇤ 0.150⇤⇤⇤ 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.100⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021)
IG 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.000) (0.019) (0.019) (0.000)
Firm FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES NO NO YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608 24,608
R2 0.161 0.162 0.759 0.192 0.193 0.762
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.160 0.745 0.192 0.192 0.748
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3.3 Dynamic regression analysis on the change of bond ratio
Bonds have increasingly become important for financial stability (Mc Kinsey 2016) and are known
to support economic growth of investors and in particular of companies (ICMA 2013). With in-
creasingly issued corporate debt, there arises the question which companies should have access
to the market. Albrizio et. al (2019), as referred to earlier, note an increased access of high-risk
companies to the U.S. market between 2008 and 2016 (Albrizio et. al 2019). Regarding this devel-
opment, it is crucial to understand what companies utilize their proceedings from corporate debt
issuance for.
In this section, I am not interested in the level of bond ratio but in the effect of additional
financing by bonds. In other words, I am seeking to understand the real effects of corporate fi-
nancing by investigating whether the additional money raised from bonds is really invested to fund
the businesses’ needs and expansion. As previously stated, the motivation behind this analysis is
whether one should allow firms easier access to the market also regarding the fact that historically
bond financing was rather targeted to large companies (ICMA 2013). The answer for a broader
access is yes if those firms invest the additional funding from bonds meaningfully and do not keep
the additional raised money as cash reserves. The latter case would hinder opportunities for other
firms in need of growth financing and would provide a disadvantage.
For the dynamic regressions, I calculate the change of bond ratio for subsequent observations
which reduces the number of observations to 36,374 firm-quarters. Further, I introduce a new
ratio measuring the investment activity of a firm in terms of capital expenditures. As a secondary















The two other dependent variables I am interested in are cash-holdings and profitability. The
three variables help me to examine whether firms that raise more bonds in their debt structure
use these funds for meaningful and value-creating investment, whether they keep it as cash on
their balance sheets and what effect the bond issuance has on the profitability of those firms. For
each variable of interest, cash-holdings, investment, and profitability, I assess both industry-quarter
fixed-effects in columns (1)(3)(5) and firm-quarter fixed-effects in columns (2)(4)(6) and use the
variables size, market-to-book value, and tangibility as controls. The resulting regression equations
are as follows where the indexes ’i’ and ’t’ indicate firms and the year-quarters respectively:
Cash holdingsit+x = DBond ratioit +Sizeit 1 +Market   to book valueit 1
+Tangibilityit 1
(6)
Investmentit+x = DBond ratioit +Sizeit 1 +Market   to book valueit 1
+Tangibilityit 1
(7)
Investment02it+x = DBond ratioit +Sizeit 1 +Market   to book valueit 1
+Tangibilityit 1
(8)
Pro f itabilityit+x = DBond ratioit +Sizeit 1 +Market   to book valueit 1
+Tangibilityit 1
(9)
In general, the impacts for the dynamic regressions are rather low and mainly visible after the
third or fourth digit of the coefficients, yet the difference in magnitude is still mentionable. For
that reason the coefficients for the following dynamic regression coefficients and standard errors
are displayed times in 1,000 basis points.
For the dynamic regression with one-quarter time-lead for the dependent variables, the addi-
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tional increase of the bond ratio has a positive, significant, consistent, and the highest effect on
the investment activity of a firm (Appendix Table 13). In numbers, if the change in bond ratio
increases by hundred percent, the investment ratio increases by roughly 0.25 basis points. Con-
versely, the change in bond ratio has a negative and consistent effect on the profitability of a firm,
however with a lower magnitude. If the change in bond ratio increases by one hundred percent,
the profitability of a firm decreases by roughly 0.15 basis points. The results for the relationship
between change in bond ratio and cash-holdings are only positive and significant for the industry-
fixed effects specification with a coefficient of 0.151. That implies that if the change in bond ratio
increases by one hundred percent, the cash-holdings ratio decreases by 1.51 basis points. Similar to
profitability, the result with cash-holdings shows a lower significance than the specifications with
the dependent variable investments. The considered control variables were size, market-to-book
value and tangibility.
Hence, the additional proportion of bonds in the debt structure has the largest and an immediate
effect on the investment activity, followed by the profitability of a firm but with a lower magnitude
in terms of significance. Such an effect is not observable for the variable cash-holdings. This
proves that firms do not collect their additional funding as cash on the balance sheets but invest
it in projects for future growth. The weaker negative relationship with profitability is naturally
as issuing bonds affects earnings negatively in the short-term which will be further noticeable in
the regression with two-quarters of time-lead where the profitability effect disappears (Appendix
Table 14). In fact, Appendix Table 14 shows that bond financing has the most long-lasting effect
on the investment behaviour of a firm as model (4) shows still significance at the 10% level. Again,
the coefficients of 0.021 implies that if the change in bond ratio increases by 100%, the investment
ratio increases by 0.2 basis points. For all the other specifications with the dependent variables
profitability and cash-holdings, the results are not significant anymore. For the role of a firm’s
profitability this implies that, apart from the negative effect in the short-run, the additional money
raised from bonds does not lead to profitability in the long-term, loosing in significance.
Further, it is interesting to note that the same regressions for the variable Investment02, de-
27
fined as the change in total assets rather than the capital expenditure over total assets, yield non-
significant results (Appendix Table 15). This implies that the positive effect of bond financing on
investment is only existing for investment that flows into research and development through capital
expenditures.
These results provide very relevant insights to better understand the effect of the corporate bond
market and to help policymakers to appropriately shape this market which shows significant scope
for further growth. This growth should support firms in their investments and should be sustain-
able. While the effect of the level of bond ratio is positive and highly significant on the investment
behaviour of a firm for roughly one subsequent quarter, the goal should be to also reach a long-
term profitability effect for the financing with bonds for subsequent quarters. The weak effect on
profitability could also be related to the previously mentioned fact of more high-risk companies,
often the less profitable ones, entering the market. As a next step, I want to understand whether
this pattern for the change in bond ratio on investment, cash-holdings, and profitability has changed
over time.
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3.3.1 Further analysis with focus on the time period before and after the financial crisis
Regarding a shift of the corporate bond market with the financial crisis and to maintain consistency
in my analysis focus, I also want to understand for the dynamic regressions, which analyses the
effect of additional financing with bonds, whether its observed pattern changes for the period
before and after the Great Financial Crisis.
For the dynamic regression with one-quarter of time-lead for the dependent variables, only
the relationship between an increase in the bond ratio and the investment of a firm before the
financial crisis is consistently significant and positive (Appendix Table 16). The regression after
the financial crisis does not show such a relation (Appendix Table 17). A very similar behaviour
of the just described coefficients is observable for the following two time-leads as well, namely
with two and three quarters (Appendix Table 18 to Table 21). Finally, the positive and significant
effect on the change in bond ratio vanishes from four quarters time-lead onwards (Appendix Table
22 and 23).
The results show that the positive effect of the change in bond ratio on investment is only
observable for the time before the financial crisis, is highly significant and lasts for roughly three
firm-quarters in that time frame. For the time after the financial crisis, the variable investment does
not show any significant relationship with the change in bond ratio across all tested time-leads.
However, a slight indication, namely the fact that for the time-lead with one and three quarters
after the financial crisis cash-holdings is significantly positive once at the industry-level and once
at the firm-level respectively, reveals a preference for holding bond fundings as cash on the balance
sheet instead of investing it. Hence, the results give an indication, but no ultimate proof, that after
the financial crisis additional funding from bonds was rather held on the balance sheet as cash,
albeit this relationship is not consistent for both firm-effects and industry-effects in the respective
cases.
This development of less investment and more cash reserves with bond financing after the Great
Financial Crisis makes historically sense. Before the crisis, with high interest-rates, investors opted
for the public debt market only for very promising investment opportunities. After the crisis, with
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easier and cheaper access to the market, not only investments were funded with bonds, but more
and more funding from bonds was held as cash reserves.
This further analysis is a revealing extension of the dynamic regression encompassing the entire
data sample. The just presented results show that the positive, albeit rather low effect of a change
in bond ratio on investment behaviour is driven by the period before the financial crisis and not
present after the financial crisis. Further, no positive effect on profitability is observed. These
results should be of main importance for policymakers when considering how to open and shape
the bond market in the future, especially with the currently observable trend of rising high-yield
firms entering the market (Albrizio et. al 2019; Mc Kinsey 2018).
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4 Conclusion
For the time period between 2003 and 2018, this study provides answers for the questions on how
U.S. companies finance themselves, which firms finance themselves largely from the debt market,
which determinants are relevant for that choice, and very importantly how companies are using the
proceedings from corporate debt issuance.
The average bond ratio for the assessed sample is 69.2%, hence indicating heterogeneity in
debt financing and showing that a substantial part of U.S. companies’ debt is financed with bonds.
Further, I show that firms which are less profitable, which have lower growth opportunities and
lower leverage have a higher percentage of their debt financed by outstanding bonds. Conversely,
firms with more cash reserves are associated with a higher bond ratio. I further prove a non-
linear, bell-shaped, relationship of the size of a firm. Finally, my results reveal that the relationship
between the dependent variable and the classification of whether a firm is investment-grade or not,
and the distinction between the period before and after the GFC is positive but firm-specific.
The results are in line with the pecking order theory of capital structure which states that a firm’s
capital structure decisions are driven by the degree of information asymmetry. In particular, my
argumentation is that firms with less internal funds will need to make more use of bond financing
as their other capacities of financing internally and with bank debt are exhausted earlier.
Lastly and importantly, I was able to prove that additional capital raised from bonds has a
negative impact on profitability in the short-term and a positive effect on the investment behaviour
both in the short-term and long-term where investment is defined as capital expenditure over total
assets. This relationship does not hold for investment defined as change in total assets. This implies
that firms invest their money in growth opportunities and do not hold it as cash reserves on their
balance sheets. Yet, this positive effect of Capex investment behaviour is only driven by the period
before the financial crisis
These results should be especially relevant for policymakers to define the future of the bond
market and to answer the question on which firms should have access to it. An important trend is
the significant scope for future growth in the bond market but the decrease in issuer quality (Çelik
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et. al 2019) as higher risk companies have more access to the corporate bond market (Albrizio
et. al 2019). Hence, a potential extension of this research would be to place special focus on the
rating of the firms, in specific the role of fallen angels in bond financing. If more investment-grade
bonds are downgraded to high-yield, this might be difficult to absorb by the non-investment grade
market and could potentially cause volatility and spreads to rise across the market (Çelik et. al
2019; Oxford Analytica 2019). It is important to understand what drives those firms to the bond
market, for example if they are seeking to finance growth or to maintain cash for stability.
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Descriptive statistics for bond-issues for the entire Mergent’s FISD data
This table presents the summary statistics for the bond-issues included in the entire Mergent’s FISD Linking
Table before matching to the Compustat financials. This gives a complete overview of the bond-issuance
activity and development for the sample period. # Issues represents the number of bonds issued in that year.
Offering amount is the sum of offering amounts for that year in billion dollars.
Year # Issues Offering amount Year # Issues Offering amount
2003 4,973 717.356 2011 7,154 1037.887
2004 4,683 722.139 2012 9,432 1040.273
2005 3,713 684.421 2013 9,950 1098.198
2006 3,288 844.567 2014 10,503 1121.239
2007 4,113 991.600 2015 10,174 1311.146
2008 3,816 849.652 2016 10,008 1179.434
2009 3,150 977.301 2017 14,643 1133.401



































































This table provides a description of the variables employed in the research paper. Firm characteristics are
retrieved from the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) database. Bond-issuance information for the variable
’Bond ratio’ is taken from Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). All values are computed
quarterly.
Variable Definition
Bond ratio Total debt divided by the sum outstanding bonds in that quarter
Profitability Net income divided by total assets
Size Logarithm of total assets
Size
2 Squared logarithm of total assets
Market-to-Book Value Market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm
Market leverage Total debt divided by market the book value of the firm
Tangibility Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets
Dividends Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is estimated to pay dividends,
and 0 otherwise
Cash-flow EBIT + decpreciation and amortization divided by total assets
Cash-holdings Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets
IG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an investment grade rating
and 0 otherwise
GFC Dummy variable equal to 1 for the years from 2003 to 2010, and equal
to 0 from 2010 to 2018
Investment Capital expenditure divided by total assets
Investment02 Change in total assets divided by total assets
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Table 7
Descriptive statistics for firm-characteristics
This table presents the summary statistics for the final sample of Compustat-leveraged firms. The sample covers U.S. firms
from the time period 2003 to 2018 and excludes utility (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial (SIC codes 6000-6999) firms. I
removed (1) firm-quarters with missing or zero values for total assets (2) firm-quarters with missing or zero values for total
debt (3) missing values for the control variables of interest. The data sample yields 51,261 firm-quarter observations. All
ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. A definition of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 6.
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max Unit of measurement
Bond ratio 51,261 0.692 0.284 0.002 0.472 0.985 1.000 Ratio
Total assets 51,261 13,886 33,501 2 1,351 11,336 534,870 Million Dollars
Total debt 51,261 4,014 10,176 0 402 3,450 190,167 Million Dollars
Profitability 51,261 0.010 0.017  0.020 0 0.020 0.041 Ratio
Size 51,261 8.275 1.598 0.540 7.208 9.336 13.190 Natural logarithm
Market-to-book 51,261 1.345 0.579 0.047 0.879 1.760 2.370 Ratio
Market leverage 51,261 0.229 0.135 0 0.121 0.324 0.477 Ratio
Cash-flow 51,261 0.046 0.046  0.043 0.017 0.077 0.126 Ratio
Cash-holdings 51,261 0.308 0.233  0.128 0.107 0.476 0.752 Ratio
Tangibility 51,261 0.305 0.226 0.000 0.110 0.494 0.694 Ratio
Investment 51,261 0.025 0.019  0.018 0.009 0.040 0.056 Ratio
Dividends 51,261 0.549 0.498 0 0 1 1 Dummy Variable
IG 51,261 0.292 0.455 0 0 1 1 Dummy Variable
GFC 51,261 0.480 0.500 0 0 1 1 Dummy Variable
Table 8
Descriptive statistics for bond-issues
This table presents the summary statistics for the bond-issues included in the final sample. The selection
of bonds included in the sample follows the linking logic provided by the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). It ensures the correct matching of firm-characteristics and bonds by imposing a conservative date
range to which a specific bond-issue can be linked. # Issues represents the number of bonds issued in that
year. Offering amount is the sum of offering amounts for that year in billion dollars.
Year # Issues Offering amount Year # Issues Offering amount
2003 394 116.038 2011 355 180.196
2004 371 99.545 2012 380 205.807
2005 288 105.426 2013 336 181.941
2006 244 114.049 2014 356 191.252
2007 311 144.08 2015 318 196.753
2008 196 141.224 2016 246 155.110
2009 282 150.776 2017 280 161.702

















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Development of the weighted average bond ratio by IG over the sample period
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Table 9
Market leverage and firm characteristics
This table represents the regression outputs of firm-characteristics on the level of market leverage (dependent
variable) of that firm. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Market leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bond ratio  0.121⇤⇤⇤  0.120⇤⇤⇤  0.060⇤⇤⇤  0.109⇤⇤⇤  0.107⇤⇤⇤  0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Profitabiltiy  1.351⇤⇤⇤  1.241⇤⇤⇤  0.716⇤⇤⇤  1.307⇤⇤⇤  1.184⇤⇤⇤  0.570⇤⇤⇤
(0.121) (0.118) (0.067) (0.113) (0.108) (0.054)
Size  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤  0.089⇤⇤⇤  0.026⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤  0.081⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018)
Size2 0.001 0.001 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.000 0.000 0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market-to-book value  0.078⇤⇤⇤  0.077⇤⇤⇤  0.100⇤⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤⇤  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.100⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Dividends  0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤  0.021⇤⇤⇤  0.021⇤⇤⇤  0.009⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Tangibiltiy 0.116⇤⇤⇤ 0.118⇤⇤⇤ 0.077⇤⇤⇤ 0.103⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
Cash-flow  0.163⇤⇤⇤  0.194⇤⇤⇤  0.198⇤⇤⇤  0.182⇤⇤⇤  0.220⇤⇤⇤  0.236⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) (0.021)
Cash-holdings  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.030⇤⇤⇤  0.009  0.049⇤⇤⇤  0.051⇤⇤⇤  0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
IG  0.004  0.005 0.018⇤  0.008  0.009 0.024⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
GFC 0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES NO NO YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261 51,261
R2 0.456 0.462 0.842 0.480 0.487 0.851

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data sample grouped into bond ratio quintiles for IG
In order to investigate which firms issue more within those which are IG rated
Quintiles Bond ratio Profitability Size Market-to-book Market leverage Dividends Tangibility Cash-flow Cash-holdings GFC
1 0.289 0.016 8.851 1.431 0.233 0.788 0.285 0.056 0.215 0.436
2 0.568 0.018 8.986 1.576 0.181 0.828 0.275 0.063 0.215 0.467
3 0.760 0.019 9.236 1.603 0.169 0.892 0.277 0.066 0.214 0.532
4 0.923 0.020 9.194 1.622 0.137 0.873 0.245 0.068 0.261 0.536
5 1.000 0.020 8.819 1.624 0.119 0.788 0.202 0.066 0.358 0.500
Table 12
Data sample grouped into bond ratio quintiles for the post-crisis period
In order to investigate which firms issue more bonds post-crisis
Quintiles Bond ratio Profitability Size Market-to-book Market leverage Dividends Tangibility Cash-flow Cash-holdings IG
1 0.238 0.007 8.836 1.197 0.306 0.561 0.319 0.041 0.276 0.218
2 0.517 0.008 8.534 1.350 0.258 0.568 0.317 0.044 0.284 0.262
3 0.732 0.011 8.836 1.394 0.228 0.668 0.324 0.052 0.271 0.376
4 0.961 0.010 8.483 1.454 0.188 0.604 0.280 0.046 0.370 0.324
Table 13
Dynamic Regression Model (t+1)
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ra-
tio on cash-holdings, investment, and profitability. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter level.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coefficients and standard errors
are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.151⇤ 0.086 0.025⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.016⇤  0.013⇤
(0.073) (0.104) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Size  18.438⇤⇤⇤  7.787⇤⇤⇤ 0.479⇤⇤⇤ 0.505⇤ 2.969⇤⇤⇤  0.807⇤⇤⇤
(3.099) (2.439) (0.169) (0.274) (0.339) (0.190)
Market-to-book value 92.534⇤⇤⇤ 7.041⇤ 3.512⇤⇤⇤ 4.119⇤⇤⇤ 10.326⇤⇤⇤ 8.600⇤⇤⇤
(19.013) (4.060) (0.705) (0.635) (0.733) (0.924)
Tangibility  43.595  42.156⇤⇤⇤ 42.347⇤⇤⇤ 2.742⇤ 2.529 0.188
(72.617) (15.624) (3.307) (1.412) (2.219) (1.309)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374
R2 0.142 0.725 0.414 0.653 0.202 0.472
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.709 0.413 0.633 0.201 0.442
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Table 14
Dynamic Regression Model (t+2)
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ra-
tio on cash-holdings, investment and profitability. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter level.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coefficients and standard errors
are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.041  0.051 0.021 0.017⇤  0.005  0.001
(0.057) (0.079) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010)
Size  17.855⇤⇤⇤  7.292⇤⇤⇤ 0.412⇤ 0.110 2.797⇤⇤⇤  1.172⇤⇤⇤
(2.835) (2.386) (0.216) (0.193) (0.318) (0.281)
Market-to-book value 84.320⇤⇤⇤  0.538 3.384⇤⇤⇤ 4.048⇤⇤⇤ 9.261⇤⇤⇤ 6.097⇤⇤⇤
(17.838) (4.417) (0.776) (0.644) (0.680) (0.756)
Tangibility  40.160  16.922 39.709⇤⇤⇤  0.695 2.120  0.701
(67.344) (14.196) (3.235) (1.407) (2.286) (1.546)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374 36,374
R2 0.125 0.672 0.372 0.607 0.172 0.433
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.653 0.371 0.585 0.171 0.400
Table 15
Dynamic Regression Models for Investment02 as change in Total Assets
This table represents different dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the
bond ratio on investments defined as change in total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-quarter
level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Coefficients and standard
errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Investment02
t+1 t+1 t+2 t+2 Before GFC (t+1) After GFC (t+1)
D Bond ratio 0.015  0.005 0.008  0.015 0.042  0.030
(0.045) (0.051) (0.040) (0.035) (0.045) (0.060)
Size  18.533⇤⇤⇤  1.387⇤  16.905⇤⇤⇤  1.501⇤  17.502⇤⇤  18.077⇤⇤⇤
(4.550) (0.734) (4.229) (0.793) (7.357) (6.504)
Market-to-book-value 37.164⇤⇤⇤ 27.024⇤⇤⇤ 27.928⇤⇤⇤ 23.375⇤⇤⇤ 30.366⇤⇤⇤ 38.368⇤⇤⇤
(4.380) (3.134) (3.507) (2.851) (7.768) (7.792)
Tangibility 8.252 5.814 9.558 5.218 24.575⇤⇤⇤ 21.587
(9.088) (4.964) (10.935) (5.825) (8.532) (19.360)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) NO NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 36,374 36,374 36,373 36,373 18,902 17,470
R2 0.102 0.026 0.094 0.022 0.134 0.141
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.025 0.042 0.021 0.060 0.071
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Table 16
Dynamic Regression Model (t+1) before the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment, and profitability for the period before the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.083 0.030 0.035⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤  0.010
(0.108) (0.039) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
Size  26.254⇤⇤⇤  2.938⇤⇤ 0.472⇤⇤⇤ 0.227 2.911⇤⇤⇤  0.985⇤⇤⇤
(3.851) (1.421) (0.122) (0.248) (0.407) (0.340)
Market-to-book value 103.545⇤⇤⇤ 5.545 3.776⇤⇤⇤ 2.426⇤⇤⇤ 9.704⇤⇤⇤ 6.135⇤⇤⇤
(15.366) (4.647) (0.642) (0.713) (0.668) (1.149)
Tangibility  45.392  28.329⇤ 38.494⇤⇤⇤  2.891 2.155 1.191
(79.333) (15.679) (3.550) (2.119) (3.045) (1.344)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 18,902 18,902 18,902 18,902 18,902 18,902
R2 0.157 0.741 0.379 0.637 0.185 0.488
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.720 0.377 0.607 0.184 0.445
Table 17
Dynamic Regression Model (t+1) after the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period after the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.200⇤⇤ 0.192 0.013 0.015  0.014  0.011
(0.060) (0.149) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Size  10.044⇤⇤⇤  6.484⇤ 0.372⇤ 0.410⇤⇤ 2.712⇤⇤⇤  1.108⇤⇤⇤
(2.747) (3.599) (0.202) (0.208) (0.362) (0.222)
Market-to-book value 75.477⇤⇤⇤ 1.943 2.920⇤⇤ 3.320⇤⇤⇤ 9.708⇤⇤⇤ 5.474⇤⇤⇤
(20.000) (7.135) (1.333) (0.791) (0.839) (1.299)
Tangibility  43.721  25.857⇤ 41.626⇤⇤⇤  1.190 2.980⇤⇤ 0.204
(56.325) (14.596) (4.114) (1.381) (1.309) (1.212)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 17,470 17,470 17,470 17,470 17,470 17,470
R2 0.125 0.726 0.408 0.685 0.201 0.498
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.703 0.407 0.659 0.199 0.456
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Table 18
Dynamic Regression Model (t+2) before the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period before the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.025  0.023 0.027⇤ 0.017⇤⇤  0.008⇤⇤⇤  0.001
(0.070) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013)
Size  26.349⇤⇤⇤  5.336⇤⇤ 0.409⇤⇤⇤  0.116 2.713⇤⇤⇤  1.283⇤⇤⇤
(3.487) (2.317) (0.140) (0.215) (0.376) (0.463)
Market-to-book value 92.364⇤⇤⇤  2.418 3.625⇤⇤⇤ 2.613⇤⇤⇤ 8.360⇤⇤⇤ 3.234⇤⇤⇤
(13.891) (5.471) (0.651) (0.901) (0.620) (0.816)
Tangibility  42.309 2.824 34.948⇤⇤⇤  6.627⇤⇤⇤ 2.392 1.644
(67.959) (15.649) (3.421) (2.419) (3.083) (1.665)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 18,901 18,901 18,901 18,901 18,901 18,901
R2 0.134 0.666 0.330 0.579 0.151 0.442
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.637 0.329 0.544 0.149 0.395
Table 19
Dynamic Regression Model (t+2) after the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period after the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.047  0.026 0.010 0.015  0.018  0.016
(0.082) (0.146) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021)
Size  9.435⇤⇤⇤  4.982⇤ 0.276 0.142 2.473⇤⇤⇤  1.044⇤⇤⇤
(2.680) (2.626) (0.202) (0.225) (0.317) (0.368)
Market-to-book-value 67.567⇤⇤⇤  4.517 2.715⇤⇤ 3.070⇤⇤⇤ 8.496⇤⇤⇤ 2.997⇤⇤
(18.744) (7.171) (1.343) (0.917) (0.824) (1.235)
Tangibility  40.715  15.199 38.144⇤⇤⇤  4.419⇤⇤⇤ 2.710⇤⇤ 0.668
(51.726) (14.501) (3.968) (1.603) (1.349) (1.508)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 17,469 17,469 17,469 17,469 17,469 17,469
R2 0.107 0.659 0.352 0.623 0.168 0.452
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.632 0.351 0.592 0.167 0.407
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Table 20
Dynamic Regression Model (t+3) before the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period before the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.001  0.036 0.050⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.018
(0.032) (0.030) (0.021) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012)
Size  25.831⇤⇤⇤  3.237 0.366⇤⇤  0.315 2.541⇤⇤⇤  1.444⇤⇤⇤
(3.300) (2.103) (0.155) (0.250) (0.346) (0.497)
Market-to-book-value 82.534⇤⇤⇤  4.793 3.204⇤⇤⇤ 1.935⇤⇤ 7.469⇤⇤⇤ 1.842⇤⇤⇤
(11.888) (5.728) (0.574) (0.902) (0.615) (0.627)
Tangibility  39.914 15.961 31.861⇤⇤⇤  8.249⇤⇤ 2.601 1.652
(59.738) (21.404) (3.536) (3.237) (3.148) (1.533)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 18,900 18,900 18,900 18,900 18,900 18,900
R2 0.114 0.614 0.284 0.536 0.128 0.416
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.581 0.282 0.497 0.126 0.366
Table 21
Dynamic Regression Model (t+3) after the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period after the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.246 0.146⇤⇤  0.015  0.017 0.013 0.018
(0.141) (0.058) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)
Size  8.820⇤⇤⇤  2.790 0.205 0.247 2.243⇤⇤⇤  1.424⇤⇤⇤
(2.721) (2.407) (0.210) (0.207) (0.294) (0.434)
Market-to-book value 59.346⇤⇤⇤  14.719⇤⇤ 2.484⇤⇤ 2.677⇤⇤⇤ 7.504⇤⇤⇤ 1.556⇤
(17.838) (6.530) (1.248) (0.776) (0.847) (0.839)
Tangibility  43.245  34.422⇤⇤ 34.640⇤⇤⇤  7.328⇤⇤⇤ 2.057  1.574
(46.346) (15.844) (4.083) (2.379) (1.371) (1.338)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 17,468 17,468 17,468 17,468 17,468 17,468
R2 0.091 0.614 0.300 0.576 0.142 0.422
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.582 0.299 0.541 0.140 0.374
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Table 22
Dynamic Regression Model (t+4) before the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period before the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.004  0.031 0.008 0.001  0.016⇤⇤⇤  0.008
(0.037) (0.053) (0.012) (0.011) (0.003) (0.016)
Size  25.324⇤⇤⇤  1.448 0.350⇤⇤  0.416 2.339⇤⇤⇤  1.912⇤⇤⇤
(3.216) (2.365) (0.146) (0.306) (0.316) (0.638)
Market-to-book value 72.338⇤⇤⇤  10.406 2.773⇤⇤⇤ 1.028 6.514⇤⇤⇤ 0.268
(11.488) (7.757) (0.550) (0.679) (0.619) (0.583)
Tangibility  37.494 35.568 28.976⇤⇤⇤  11.378⇤⇤⇤ 2.933 4.079⇤⇤⇤
(51.897) (25.405) (3.558) (2.747) (2.856) (1.559)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 18,899 18,899 18,899 18,899 18,899 18,899
R2 0.097 0.575 0.242 0.503 0.107 0.395
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.539 0.241 0.461 0.105 0.344
Table 23
Dynamic Regression Model (t+4) after the Great Financial Crisis
This table represents dynamic regression models to measure the prediction of the change in the bond ratio
on cash-holdings, investment and profitability for the period after the financial crisis. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in 1,000 basis points.
Cash-holdings Investment Profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Bond ratio 0.0255 0.103  0.030  0.003  0.027⇤  0.017
(0.187) (0.097) (0.017) (0.020) (0.008) (0.010)
Size  8.446⇤⇤⇤  1.715 0.160 0.193 2.033⇤⇤⇤  1.566⇤⇤
(2.966) (2.564) (0.228) (0.283) (0.291) (0.613)
Market-to-book value 52.369⇤⇤⇤  17.067⇤⇤ 2.260⇤⇤ 2.103⇤⇤⇤ 6.634⇤⇤⇤ 0.343
(17.263) (7.310) (1.108) (0.727) (0.836) (0.648)
Tangibility  39.549  14.197 31.586⇤⇤⇤  11.738⇤⇤⇤ 1.930  0.211
(40.523) (14.827) (4.046) (2.470) (1.247) (1.543)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES NO YES NO) YES NO
Cluster Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter
Observations 17,467 17,467 17,467 17,467 17,467 17,467
R2 0.077 0.577 0.254 0.541 0.119 0.403
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.542 0.253 0.504 0.117 0.354
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